Domain-general and Domain-specific Patterns of Activity Support Metacognition in Human Prefrontal Cortex by Morales, Jorge et al.
Behavioral/Cognitive
Domain-General and Domain-Specific Patterns of Activity
Supporting Metacognition in Human Prefrontal Cortex
X Jorge Morales,1 XHakwan Lau,2,3,4 and XStephenM. Fleming5,6
1Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027, 2Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California
90095, 3Brain Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095, 4Department of Psychology, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong,
5Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United KingdomWC1N 3BG, and 6Max Planck Centre for Computational
Psychiatry and Ageing Research, University College London, London, United KingdomWC1B 5EH
Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of one’s own cognitive processes in various domains; for example, memory and
perception. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is applied to different tasks or if
self-evaluative processes are domain specific. Here, we investigated this issue directly by examining the neural substrates engaged when
metacognitive judgmentsweremadebyhumanparticipants of both sexesduringperceptual andmemory tasksmatched for stimulus and
performance characteristics. By comparing patterns of fMRI activity while subjects evaluated their performance, we revealed both
domain-specific and domain-generalmetacognitive representations.Multivoxel activity patterns in anterior prefrontal cortex predicted
levels of confidence in a domain-specific fashion, whereas domain-general signals predicting confidence and accuracy were found in a
widespread network in the frontal and posteriormidline. The demonstration of domain-specificmetacognitive representations suggests
the presence of a content-rich mechanism available to introspection and cognitive control.
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Introduction
Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of one’s
cognitive processes in various domains; for example, perception
ormemory (Flavell, 1979;Nelson andNarens, 1990;Metcalfe and
Shimamura, 1994; Fleming et al., 2012a). Metacognitive ability
can be assessed in the laboratory by quantifying the trial-by-trial
correspondence between objective performance and subjective
confidence (Galvin et al., 2003; Maniscalco and Lau, 2012; Over-
gaard and Sandberg, 2012; Fleming and Lau, 2014). Anatomical
(Fleming et al., 2010, 2012b; McCurdy et al., 2013; Maniscalco et
al., 2017), functional (Fleck et al., 2006; Yokoyama et al., 2010;
Baird et al., 2013; Hilgenstock et al., 2014), and neuropsycholog-
ical (Shimamura and Squire, 1986; Schnyer et al., 2004; Fleming
et al., 2014) evidence indicates specific neural substrates (especially
in frontolateral, frontomedial, and parietal regions) contribute to
metacognition across a range of task domains, including perception
andmemory.However, the neurocognitive architecture support-
ing metacognition remains controversial. Does metacognition
rely on a common, domain-general resource that is recruited to
evaluate performance on a variety of tasks? Or is metacognition
supported by domain-specific components?
Currentcomputationalperspectives (Pougetet al., 2016;Fleming
and Daw, 2017) suggest that both domain-general and domain-
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Significance Statement
Weused human neuroimaging to investigate processes supportingmemory and perceptualmetacognition. It remains controver-
sial whethermetacognition relies on a global resource that is applied to different tasks or if self-evaluative processes are specific to
particular tasks. Usingmultivariate decodingmethods, we provide evidence that perceptual- andmemory-specificmetacognitive
representations coexist with generic confidence signals. Our findings reconcile previously conflicting results on the domain
specificity/generality of metacognition and lay the groundwork for a mechanistic understanding of metacognitive judgments.
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specific representations may be important for guiding behavior.
One needs to be able to compare confidence estimates in a “com-
mon currency” across a range of arbitrary decision scenarios (de
Gardelle and Mamassian, 2014). One solution to this problem is
to maintain a global resource with access to arbitrary sensorimo-
tor mappings (Holroyd et al., 2005; Heekeren et al., 2006; Cole et
al., 2013). Candidate neural substrates for a domain-general re-
source are the frontoparietal and cingulo-opercular networks,
known to be involved in arbitrary control operations (Cole et al.,
2013). In particular, the posteriormedial prefrontal cortex (PFC)
(encompassing the paracingulate cortex and presupplementary
motor area) has been implicated in representing confidence,
monitoring conflict and detecting errors across a range of tasks
(Gehring et al., 1993; Botvinick et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004; Fleming et al., 2012b). Conversely, if the system only had
access to generic confidence signals, then appropriate switching
between particular tasks or strategies on the basis of their ex-
pected success would be compromised. Functional imaging evi-
dence implicates human anterior PFC in tracking the reliability of
specific alternative strategies during decision making (Donoso et
al., 2014) and such regions may also support domain-specific
representations of confidence.
Current behavioral evidence of a shared resource for meta-
cognition is ambiguous, in part due to the difficulty of distill-
ing metacognitive processes from those supporting primary task
performance (Galvin et al., 2003; Maniscalco and Lau, 2012;
Fleming and Lau, 2014). Some studies have found that efficient
metacognition in one task predicts good metacognition in an-
other (McCurdy et al., 2013; Ais et al., 2016; Ruby et al., 2017;
Samaha and Postle, 2017; Faivre et al., 2018), whereas others
indicate the independence of metacognitive abilities (Kelemen et
al., 2000; Baird et al., 2013; Vo et al., 2014). Recent studies using
bias-free measures of metacognition have identified differences
in the neural correlates ofmemory and perceptualmetacognition
in both healthy subjects (Baird et al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013)
and neuropsychological patients (Fleming et al., 2014). However,
the study of behavioral individual differences provides only indi-
rect evidence of the neural and computational architecture sup-
porting metacognition.
Here, we investigated this ontology directly by examining
neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments are
made during perceptual andmemory tasks matched for stimulus
and performance characteristics.We used a combination of univar-
iate and multivariate analyses of fMRI data to identify domain-
specific and domain-general neural substrates engaged during
metacognitive judgments. We also distinguished activations en-
gaged by a metacognitive judgment from neural activity that
tracks confidence level. Together, our findings reveal the coexis-
tence of generic and specific confidence representations consis-
tent with a computational hierarchy underpinning effective
metacognition.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Thirty healthy subjects (ages 18–33 years, mean 24.97; SD  4.44; 14
males) with normal or corrected-to-normal visionweremonetarily com-
pensated and gave written informed consent to participate in the study at
the Center for Neural Science at New York University. The study proto-
cols were approved by the local institutional review board. The number
of participantswas determined a priori atn 30,which is consistentwith
recent guidelines on neuroimaging sample sizes (Poldrack et al., 2017).
Due to behavioral and in-scannermotion cutoff criteria, six subjectswere
excluded from further analysis (details below). We present the results of
24 subjects whose data were fully analyzed.
Experimental and task design
The experiment had a 2 2 2 design: condition (confidence/follow)
task domain (perception/memory)  stimulus type (shapes/words). It
consisted of six scanner runs, each with eight nine-trial miniblocks (72
trials per run, 432 trials in total). Perceptual andmemory two-alternative
forced-choice (2-AFC) tasks were presented in separate, interleaved runs
(three runs per task; order counterbalanced across subjects). In each run,
there were four pairs of miniblocks from the confidence and follow con-
ditions. To avoid stimulus confounds, two different types of stimulus
were used throughout the experiment. In each run, two pairs of confi-
dence/follow miniblocks used words and the remaining two pairs used
abstract shapes (interleaved and order counterbalanced across runs).
In the perceptual task, subjects were asked to report the brighter of two
stimuli on each trial. In the memory task, subjects began each miniblock
by learning a set of nine consecutively presented stimuli. A stimulus from
this set was then presented on each subsequent trial (in randomized order)
alongside a new stimulus. The subjects’ task was to identify the studied
stimulus. In miniblocks from the confidence condition, subjects had to
rate their confidence in their performance in each trial by selecting a
number from a scale of 1 to 4. In miniblocks from the follow condition,
subjects had to “follow the computer” in each trial by pressing the button
corresponding to the highlighted number regardless of their confidence.
The highlighted number was yoked to their ratings in the previous con-
fidence miniblock (randomized presentation order) to ensure similar
low-level visuomotor characteristics in both conditions for any given
pair of miniblocks.
Subjects were reminded at the beginning of each miniblock of the
condition, task, and stimulus type that would follow. They used two
fingers of their right hand to respond on anMRI-compatible button box:
left stimulus (index) and right stimulus (middle). For confidence ratings,
they used four fingers: 1 (index), 2 (middle), 3 (ring), and 4 (little). If
subjects failed to provide either type of response within the allotted time
(see Fig. 1A for details), the trial wasmissed and an exclamationmarkwas
displayed for the remainder of the trial. Failing to press the highlighted
number counted as a missed trial.
Before entering the scanner, participants were familiarized with the
tasks and the confidence rating scale. After computing independent
brightness thresholding for words and abstract shapes, subjects practiced
one of each miniblock type (i.e., eight miniblocks). Instructions empha-
sized that confidence ratings should reflect relative confidence and par-
ticipants were encouraged to use all ratings. The whole experiment lasted
1.5 h.
Stimuli
The experiment was programmed in MATLAB (The MathWorks) and
stimuli were presented using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). Abstract,
22- or 28-line shapes were created randomly by specifying an (invisible)
grid of 6 6 squares that subtended 4 degrees of visual angle where lines
could connect two vertices horizontally, vertically, or diagonally. The
first line always stemmed from the central vertex of the invisible grid
randomly connecting one of the surrounding eight vertices to ensure
shape centrality within the grid. The remaining lines were drawn sequen-
tially, ensuring that all lines were connected. Orientation and originating
vertices were selected randomly.
All words were nouns of six to 12 letters with one to four syllables
obtained from the Medical Research Council Psycholinguistic Database
(Wilson, 1988). In the perceptual task, words had high familiarity,
concreteness, and imageability ratings (400–700). In the memory task,
words had low ratings (100–400) to increase task difficulty. Each word
and each shape was presented once throughout the experiment (across
perceptual and memory blocks, including practice trials). All subjects
were tested on the same words and shapes (counterbalanced across con-
fidence and follow conditions across subjects). Words and rating scales
were presented using DS-Digital font (40 points) to make their visual
features similar to the abstract shapes.
To obtain stimulus sets of similar difficulty for shapes and words, we
ran a series of pilot studies in which participants rated abstract shapes’
distinctiveness and then performed the memory task [15 miniblocks per
subject; 171 AmazonMechanical Turk participants (73 for shapes; 98 for
Morales et al. • General and Specific Metacognition in PFC J. Neurosci., April 4, 2018 • 38(14):3534–3546 • 3535
words) and six subjects in the laboratory who performed a complete
version of the experiment]. Based on these results, we expected a mean
performance in the memory task of 71% correct responses when 22-
and 28-line distinctive shapes were used in the same block and 83%
correct when long words (6–12 letters) with low concreteness, image-
ability, and familiarity ratings (100–400) were used. To further increase
difficulty, we created pairs of old and new words split between the
confidence and follow conditions (counterbalanced across subjects),
blocked by similar semantic category (e.g., finance, argumentation, char-
acter traits, etc.), such that each new word within a block was freely
associated with one old word (and when possible, vice versa) according
to theUniversity of South Florida free association normeddatabase (Nel-
son et al., 2004).
In the perceptual task, the difference in brightness (b) between the
two stimuli was calibrated for each subject and independently for each
stimulus type. The brightness of a randomly located reference stimulus
was fixed (middle gray). The brightness of the nonreference stimulus was
titrated using a staircase procedure similar to previous experiments
(Fleming et al., 2010, 2012b, 2014).During practice, we used a fixed, large
step size two-down/one-up procedure until subjects reached 15 reversals
or 90 trials. The step sizes followed recommended ratios to match the
expected performance in memory blocks (García-Pe´rez, 1998). The ex-
periment began with a b value determined by the average of the b
values at each reversal, excluding the first one. Throughout the experi-
ment, we kept a small step size staircase running to account for learning
or tiredness.
Amiddle gray fixation cross subtending 0.3 degrees of visual angle was
presented between the two stimuli on a black background. The reference
stimulus in the perceptual task and all stimuli in the memory task were
middle gray. All stimuli were surrounded by an isoluminant blue bound-
ing box separated from the stimulus by a gap of at least 0.15 degrees of
visual angle.
Behavioral data analysis
Data analysis was performed inMATLAB and statistical analysis in RStu-
dio (R Studio Team, 2015). We estimated metacognitive efficiency by
computing log(meta-d’/d’) where d’ is a signal detection theoretic mea-
sure of type I sensitivity and meta-d’ is a measure of type II sensitivity
(i.e., the degree to which a subject discriminates correct form incorrect
responses) expressed in the same units as type I sensitivity (d’) (Manis-
calco and Lau, 2012; Fleming and Lau, 2014). Meta-d’ indicates the d’
that would have been predicted to give rise to the observed confidence
rating data assuming a signal detection theoretic ideal observer. Meta-d’
 d’ indicates an optimal type II behavior for the observed type I behav-
ior. Meta-d’ greater or less than d’ indicates metacognition that is better
or worse, respectively, than the expected given task performance, as may
occur, for instance, if first-order decisions and confidence are supported
by partly parallel processing streams (Fleming and Daw, 2017). We used
hierarchical Bayesian estimation to incorporate subject-level uncertainty
in group-level parameter estimates (Fleming, 2017). Certainty on this
parameter was determined by computing the 95% high-density interval
(HDI) from the posterior samples (Kruschke, 2010). For correlation and
individual differences analyses, we used single-subject Bayesian model
fits. Two subjects were discarded for missing10% of the trials (i.e.,1
SD from the average missed trials, which was 5%).Missed trials were not
analyzed.
fMRI data acquisition
Brain images were acquired using a 3T Allegra scanner (Siemens).
BOLD-sensitive functional images were acquired using a T2*-weighted
gradient-echo echo-planar images (42 transverse slices, interleaved ac-
quisition; TR, 2.34 s; TE, 30 ms; matrix size: 64 64; 3 3mm in-plane
resolution; slice thickness: 3 mm; flip angle: 90°; FOV: 126 mm). The
main experiment consisted of three runs of 210 volumes and three runs
of 296 volumes for the perceptual and memory tasks, respectively. We
collected aT1-weightedMPRAGEanatomical scan (1 11mmvoxels;
176 slices) and local field maps for each subject.
fMRI data preprocessing
Imaging analysis was performed using SPM12 (Statistical Parametric
Mapping; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first five volumes of each run
were discarded to allow for T1 stabilization. Functional images were
realigned and unwarped using local field maps (Andersson et al., 2001)
and then slice-time corrected (Sladky et al., 2011). Each participant’s
structural image was segmented into gray matter, white matter, CSF,
bone, soft tissue, and air/background images using a nonlinear deforma-
tion field to map it onto template tissue probability maps (Ashburner
and Friston, 2005). This mapping was applied to both structural and
functional images to create normalized images toMontreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) space.Normalized imageswere spatially smoothed using
a Gaussian kernel (8 mm FWHM). We set a within-run 1 mm rotation
and 4 mm affine motion cutoff criterion, which led to the exclusion of 4
subjects, leaving a total of 24 subjects whose functional and behavioral
data were fully analyzed.
Univariate analysis
All of our general linear models (GLMs) focus on the “rating period” of
each trial by specifying boxcar regressors beginning at the subjects’ type I
response and ending at their type II response (i.e., either confidence
rating or number press). Motion correction parameters were entered as
covariates of no interest along with a constant term per run. Regressors
were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. Low-
frequency drifts were excluded with a 1/128 Hz high-pass filter. Missed
trials were notmodeled. For judgment-related (JR) analyses, we created a
GLM with two regressors of interest per run to estimate BOLD response
amplitudes in each voxel during the rating period in each trial of the
confidence and follow blocks. For the confidence-level-related (CLR)
parametric modulation analysis, a GLM was used to estimate BOLD
responses in the confidence blocks. There were two regressors of interest
in each run, one modeling the confidence rating period and another that
encoded a parametric modulation by the four available confidence
ratings (1–4).
Statistical inference. For the JR analysis, single-subject contrast images
of the confidence and follow regressors were entered into a second-level
random-effects analysis using one-sample t tests against zero to assess
group-level significance. For the CLR parametric modulation analysis,
single-subject contrast images of the parametric modulator were entered
into a similar second-level random-effects analysis. For conjunction
analyses of activations common to both domains, second-level maps
thresholded at p 0.001 (uncorrected) were intersected to reveal regions
of shared statistically significant JR and CLR activity. Activations were visu-
alized using MRIcro (http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/crnl/mricro).
All second-level unthresholded statistical images were uploaded to Neu-
rovault (Gorgolewski et al., 2015) (https://neurovault.org/collections/
3232/).
ROI analysis. To define regions of interest (ROIs), 12mm spheres were
centered at MNI coordinates identified from previous literature (see Fig.
3C). ROIs in left rostrolateral PFC (L rlPFC) [33, 44, 28], right rlPFC (R
rlPFC) [27, 53, 25], and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex/presupplemen-
tary motor area (dACC/pre-SMA) [0, 17, 46] were created based on
(Fleming et al., 2012b). The mask for precuneus (PCUN) [0, 64, 24]
was based on (McCurdy et al., 2013). The MNI x-coordinates for the
dACC/pre-SMA and PCUN masks were set to 0 to ensure bilaterality.
Beta values were extracted from subjects’ contrast images for the JR and
CLR univariate analyses, respectively.
Multivoxel pattern analysis
Multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) was performed in MATLAB using
the Decoding Toolbox (Hebart et al., 2014). We classified runwise beta
images from GLMs modeling JR and CLR activity patterns in ROI and
whole-brain searchlight analyses. ROI MVPAs were performed on nor-
malized, smoothed images using the ROI spheres as masks. Previous
work has shown that these preprocessing steps have minimal impact on
support vector machine (SVM) classification accuracy while allowing
meaningful comparison across subject-specific differences in anatomy,
as in standard fMRI analyses (Kamitani and Sawahata, 2010; Op de Beeck,
2010). A single accuracy value per subject, per condition, and per ROI was
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extracted and used for group analysis and statistical testing. As a control,
we added a 6-mm-radius sphere centered at the ventricles [0 2 15].
Whole-brain searchlight analyses used 12mm-radius spheres centered
around a given voxel for all voxels on spatially realigned and slice-time-
corrected images from each subject to create whole-brain accuracymaps.
For group-level analyses, these individual searchlightmaps were spatially
normalized and smoothed using a Gaussian kernel (8 mm FWHM) and
entered into one-sample t tests against chance accuracy (Hebart et al.,
2014, 2016). Whole-brain cluster inference was performed in the same
manner as in univariate analysis. Visualizations were made with Surf Ice
(https://www.nitrc.org/projects/surfice/).
Before decoding, for JR activity pattern classification, wemodeled two
regressors of interest per run focused on the rating periods in the confi-
dence and follow conditions. For classification of CLR activity patterns,
we collapsed ratings 1 and 2 into a low-confidence regressor and ratings
3 and 4 into a high-confidence regressor to allow binary classification.
The remaining parameters of no interest were specified as in the univar-
iate case. For the CLR searchlight analysis, we used an exclusive mask of
activity patterns associated with usage of the confidence scale obtained
from the successful cross-classification of button presses (1–2 vs 3–4)
between the confidence and follow conditions to eliminate low-level
visuomotor confounds (see Fig. 4D).
In independent across-domain classifications, we used the runwise
beta images reflecting JR and CLR activity as pattern vectors in a linear
support vector classification model (as implemented in LIBSVM). We
assigned each vector from each domain a label corresponding to the
classes confidence (1) and follow (1) in the JR analysis and low confi-
dence (1) and high confidence (1) in the CLR analysis. We trained an
SVMwith the vectors from one domain (three per class, six in total) and
tested the decoder on the six vectors from the other domain (and vice
versa) (see Fig. 4A, left), obtaining amean average classification accuracy
value for each of these two-way cross-classifications.
For within-domain classifications, we ran independent leave-one-
run-out cross-validations for each domain on JR activity patterns (con-
fidence vs follow) and CLR activity patterns (low vs high confidence).
Pattern vectors from two of the three runs in each domain were used to
train an SVM to predict the same classes in the vectors from the left-out
run. We compared the true labels of the left-out run with the labels
predicted by themodel and iterated this process for the other two runs to
calculate a mean cross-validated accuracy independently for each do-
main (see Fig. 4A, right).
We also tested the ability of confidence-related activity patterns to
predict objective performance in the absence of confidence reports. We
used aGLM thatmodeled low versus high confidence trials with a regres-
sor that focused on the rating period and incorrect versus correct follow
trials with a regressor that focused on the decision period (i.e., from
stimulus onset to subjects’ type I response). We performed a cross-
classification analysis in which a decoder trained on confidence trials
(low vs high confidence) was tested on pattern vectors from follow trials
(incorrect vs correct) and vice versa (collapsed across domain). This
confidence-objective performance generalization score was compared
with a leave-one-run-out cross-validation analysis decoding low versus
high confidence on confidence trials only (collapsed across domain).
Together, these scores characterize whether a particular set of patterns
are specific to confidence or also generalize to predict objective perfor-
mance (Cortese et al., 2016) (see Fig. 5).
Individual differences
Metacognitive efficiency scores (log meta-d’/d’) for each subject were
estimated independently for the perceptual and memory tasks, together
with a single score collapsed across domains. These scores were inserted
as covariates in second-level analyses ofwithin-perception,within-memory,
and across-domain classifications of confidence-level-related activity, re-
spectively, to assess the parametric relationship between metacognitive
efficiency and decoding success.
Results
We analyzed the data from 24 subjects who underwent hemody-
namic neuroimaging while performing two-alternative forced-
choice discrimination tasks in perceptual and memory domains
(Fig. 1A). In the perceptual task, subjects were asked to indicate
the brighter of two stimuli (words or abstract shapes). In the
memory task, subjects were asked to memorize exemplars of the
same stimulus types and then select the previously learned stim-
ulus from two stimuli presented on each trial. In half of the trials
(“confidence” condition), subjects performed ametacognitive
evaluation after the discrimination task by rating their confi-
dence in the correctness of their response by selecting a number
on a scale of 1 to 4 (1  not confident; 4  very confident). To
differentiate metacognitive-related activity from visuomotor ac-
tivity engaged by use of the confidence scale, in the other half of
trials (“follow” condition), subjects were asked to respond ac-
cording to a highlighted number without evaluating confidence
in their response. To avoid stimulus-type confounds, two differ-
ent types of stimuli, words and abstract shapes, were used in both
tasks.
Behavior
We first compared task performance, measured by percentage of
correct responses, across condition, task, and stimulus type. A
2  2  2 repeated-measures ANOVA (confidence/follow 
perception/memory shapes/words) showed that performance
waswellmatched across conditions (confidence vs follow) (F(1,23)
3.036, p 0.095). None of the four paired t tests (domain stimu-
lus) comparing performance between the confidence and follow
conditions returned a significant difference (p  0.05). In the
remainder of the behavioral analyses, we focused on the confi-
A
B C
Figure 1. Task design and performance results. A, Subjects performed two-alternative
forced-choice discrimination tasks about perception and memory. In perception blocks, sub-
jects selected the brighter of two stimuli. Memory blocks started with an encoding period and
then subjects indicated in each trial which of two stimuli appeared during the encoding period.
Abstract shapes and words were used as stimuli in both tasks. In confidence blocks, subjects
rated their confidence and, in follow blocks, they pressed the highlighted number. B, Percent-
age correct responses per block type in the confidence condition. Each marker represents a
subject. C, Mean percentage correct responses by domain averaged over subjects and stimulus
types. Dotted lines indicate chance performance. Bars indicate SEM. n.s., Not significant; P,
perception; M, memory.
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dence condition. Matching performance across stimulus type
was more challenging because subjects’ memory for words was
expected to be considerably higher than that for abstract shapes
trials based on pilot data (see Materials andMethods for details).
Instead, we aimed tomatch subjects’ performance independently
for each stimulus type across task domains by titrating the diffi-
culty of the perceptual task to approximate the performance ex-
pected for the corresponding stimulus type in the memory task
(shapes: perceptual M  73%, memory M  67%; words: per-
ceptual M  81%, memory M  89%; Fig. 1B). Critically, this
ensured that performance was matched across task domains
when averaging stimulus types across participants (perceptual:
M 77%,memory:M 78%; paired t test t(23) 0.38, p 0.70;
Fig. 1C). A 2 2 repeated-measures ANOVA of performance in
the confidence condition (perception/memory shapes/words)
confirmed therewas nomain effect of domain (F(1,23) 0.15, p
0.702). However, we observed a main effect of stimulus type due
to greater overall performance on words (F(1,23)  75.69, p 
9.87  109) and a domain  stimulus interaction due to a
greater difference in performance between shapes and words in
the memory compared with the perception task (F(1,23) 16.74,
p 0.00045).
Subjects were faster providing type I responses in perceptual
trials (M 636ms) than inmemory trials (M 1222ms). There
was also a small difference in reaction times between shape (M
967 ms) and word (M  892 ms) trials. A 2  2 repeated-
measures ANOVA confirmed a main effect of domain (F(1,23)
367, p  1.23  1015) driven by slower reaction types in the
memory task. There was also a main effect of stimulus type on
response time (F(1,23) 8.95, p 0.006), as well as a significant
domain  stimulus interaction due to a greater difference in
reaction times between shapes and words in memory compared
with the perception task (F(1,23) 5.82, p 0.024).
As expected, subjects gave higher confidence ratings after cor-
rect decisions than after incorrect decisions (Fig. 2A) and mean
confidence ratings were similar across task domains (perceptual
M 2.62, memoryM 2.47; paired t test t(23) 1.26, p 0.22).
Reaction times for confidence ratings were not different between
domains (perceptual M 518 ms, memory M 516 ms; paired
t test t(23) 0.16, p 0.87). We next estimated log (meta-d’/d’),
a metacognitive efficiencymeasure derived from signal detection
theory that assays the degree to which confidence ratings distin-
guish between correct and incorrect trials (Maniscalco and Lau,
2012; Fleming and Lau, 2014; Fleming, 2017).We used hierarchi-
cal Bayesian estimation to incorporate subject-level uncertainty
in group-level parameter estimates (Fleming, 2017). Metacogni-
tive efficiency in the perceptual task was significantly lower than
in the memory task (p0  1; for details, see Fig. 2B and the
Materials andMethods), consistentwithprevious findings (Fleming
et al., 2014). Metacognitive efficiency above optimality (meta-d’
d’) in memory trials suggests subjects had better metacognition
than expected given their task performance, whereas the subop-
timal metacognitive efficiency in perceptual trials suggests that
subjects had worse metacognition than expected given their task
performance (assuming an ideal observer in both cases). We did
not find a correlation between subjects’ individual metacognitive
efficiency scores in the perceptual and memory domains (r(22)
0.076; p  0.72; Fig. 2C). We also evaluated the correlation
coefficient within a hierarchical model of meta-d’, which takes
into account uncertainty in subject-level model fits (Fleming,
2017). The 95% confidence interval on the posterior correlation
coefficient overlapped zero in this analysis (  0.205; HDI 
[0.826, 0.358]), also indicating a dissociation between
domains.
We next estimated metacognitive efficiency separately for
each stimulus type (Fig. 2D). A 2 2 repeated-measures ANOVA
(perception/memory shapes/words) indicated that metacogni-
tive efficiency was greater for memory than perception (F(1,23) 
22.44, p  8.97  105). Importantly, there was no stimulus
main effect (F(1,23) 0.015, p 0.902) and there was no interac-
tion between domain and stimulus type (F(1,23)  2.835, p 
0.106). To further assess a potential covariation between meta-
cognitive abilities in each domain, we calculated for each subject
a domain-generality index (DGI) that quantifies the similarity
between scores in each domain for each participant (Fleming et
al., 2014) as follows:
DGI logMP logMM
whereMP perceptual meta-d’/d’ andMMmemory meta-d’/
d’. Lower DGI scores indicate more similar metacognitive effi-
ciencies between domains (DGI  0 indicates identical scores).
MeanDGI for shapes (1.42), words (0.66), and collapsed by stim-
ulus type (0.95) were higher than zero (Fig. 2D). Metacognition
for words was behaviorally more stable across domains because
the DGI was smaller than for shapes (paired t test: t(23)  2.86;
p 0.009). Together, these results suggest domain-specific con-
straints on metacognitive ability.
fMRI analyses
We next turned to our fMRI data to assess the overlap between
neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments are
made during perceptual andmemory tasks. A full understanding
of the neural substrates of metacognition requires an indepen-
dent examination of the process of engaging in a metacognitive
task and the level of confidence expressed by the subject (Chua et
A B
C D
Figure 2. Metacognitive measures. A, Mean number of correct and incorrect trials per con-
fidence rating. B, Metacognitive efficiency measured by log(meta-d’/d’). Zero indicates that
metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) is equal to task sensitivity d’ (i.e., the d’ that would have
been predicted to give rise to the observed confidence rating data assuming a signal detection
theoretic ideal observer). Group-level hierarchical Bayesian estimates differed significantly be-
tweendomains. Error bars indicate95%HDI fromposterior samples.C,Metacognitive efficiency
scores obtained from single-subject Bayesian model fits were not correlated across perceptual
and memory domains. D, DGI for each subject that quantifies the similarity between their
metacognitive efficiency scores in each domain (see main text for details). Greater DGI scores
indicate less metacognitive consistency across domains. Mean log(meta-d’/d’) values for
each stimulus type in both domains are shown for reference. Bars in A and D indicate SEM.
***p0 1. P, Perception; M, memory.
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al., 2014). To this end, in both univariate andmultivariate analyses,
we focused on two distinct features of metacognition-related activ-
ity. First, we assessed brain regions engaged in JR activity (i.e., the
difference between confidence trials requiring a metacognitive
judgment and the follow condition). Second, we assessed brain
regions engaged in CLR activity. In univariate CLR analysis, we
focused on the parametric relationship between confidence rat-
ings (1–4) and neural activity. In multivariate CLR analysis, we
collapsed ratings 1 and 2 into a low-confidence category and
ratings 3 and 4 into a high-confidence category to allow binary
classification of activity patterns.
Univariate results
JR activity. In standard univariate analyses, we found elevated
activity in dACC/pre-SMA, bilateral insulae, and superior and
middle frontal gyri when contrasting the confidence against the
follow condition (collapsed by domain), which is consistent with
previous findings (Fleming et al., 2012b) (Fig. 3A). There were no
significant clusters of activity in the reverse contrast (follow 
confidence). Splitting the data by domain
(Table 1), an interaction contrast (mem-
ory confidence  memory follow) 
(perception confidence perception fol-
low) revealed significant clusters of activ-
ity in middle cingulate gyrus, left insula,
PCUN, left hippocampus, and cerebellum
(Fig. 3B, blue). No significant clusters of
activity were found in the reverse interac-
tion contrast. In a conjunction analysis, ele-
vated activity for the confidence  follow
conditionwas observed across both percep-
tion andmemory trials in anterior cingulate
and right insula (Fig. 3B, green).
To further quantify these effects for
each task domain, we focused on four a
priori ROIs in the dACC/pre-SMA, bilat-
eral rlPFC, and PCUN (Fig. 3C and the
Materials and Methods), which previous
studies have found to be recruited by per-
ceptual and memory metacognition (Fleck
et al., 2006; Fleming et al., 2010, 2012b;
Baird et al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013).
In a series of repeated-measures 2  2
ANOVAS (condition task), we found a
main effect of greater activity on confi-
dence compared with follow trials in all
ROIs except PCUN, where instead we ob-
served amain effect of task, with increased
activity on memory trials (Fig. 3D; condi-
tion main effect: dACC/pre-SMA, F(1,23)
 19.34, p  0.0002; left rlPFC, F(1,23) 
6.62, p 0.017; right rlPFC, F(1,23) 9.28,
p  0.006; PCUN: F(1,23)  0.40, p 
0.532; task main effect: dACC/pre-
SMA, F(1,23)  2.33, p  0.14; left rlPFC,
F(1,23) 0.95, p 0.34; right rlPFC, F(1,23)
 4.94, p 0.036; PCUN: F(1,23) 36.78,
p 3.47 106). We found that the dif-
ference between confidence and follow
trials was greater in memory than in
perception trials in dACC/pre-SMA, reca-
pitulating the whole-brain results (condi-
tion  task interaction; F(1,23)  12.16,
p 0.0019; paired t test, memory: t(23)
5.47, p  0.0001, perceptual: t(23)  1.92, p  0.067). A similar
interaction pattern was observed in the PCUN (condition task
interaction: F(1,23)  15.86, p  0.0006; paired t test, memory:
t(23)  2.43, p  0.023, perceptual: t(23)  1.54, p  0.136).
There were no interactions in frontal regions (left rlPFC, F(1,23)
0.07, p  0.795; right rlPFC, F(1,23)  0.002, p  0.968). These
results are compatiblewith previous findings indicating a distinc-
tive contribution of PCUN to memory metacognition (Baird et
al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013).
CLR activity. We next sought to investigate the parametric
relationship between confidence level and neural activity. Col-
lapsing across domains, we found activity in the left precentral
and postcentral gyri, the posterior midline, ventral striatum, and
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) correlated positively with confi-
dence ratings (Fig. 3E, hot colors). We also replicated negative
correlations between confidence and activation in dACC/pre-
SMA, parietal cortex, and bilateral PFC that have been reported
in several previous studies (Fleck et al., 2006; Fleming et al.,
A
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Figure3. fMRIunivariate analysis results.A–D, JR activity.A,Whole-brainanalysis of significant activation in the confidence
follow contrast (collapsed by domain); there were no significant clusters in the follow confidence contrast. B, (Memory confi-
dencememory follow) (perception confidence perception follow) interaction contrast (blue). There were no significant
clusters in the reverse contrast. The conjunctionofmemory confidencememory followandperception confidenceperception
follow contrasts is indicated in green. C, Spherical binarymasks of four a priori ROIs, 1 dACC/pre-SMA, 2 L rlPFC, 3 R rlPFC,
and 4 PCUN, and an ROI in the ventricles (5) used as a control region in multivariate analyses (Fig. 4). D, Estimated mean beta
values for JR activity by domain in the main four ROIs displayed in C. E–G, CLR activity. E, Whole-brain analysis of activity
parametrically modulated by level of confidence (collapsed by domain). Hot colors indicate a positive correlation with confidence
and cool colors a negative correlation. F, Memory perception contrast (blue) testing for differences between the parametric
effect of confidence by domain; there were no significant clusters in the perceptionmemory contrast. A conjunction analysis
revealed shared activity that was positively (green) and negatively (yellow) correlated with confidence levels in both domains.
G, Estimated mean beta values of CLR activity in the main four ROIs displayed in C. All displayed whole-brain activations are
significant at a cluster-defining threshold p 0.001, corrected for multiple comparisons. pFWE 0.05; except for conjunction
analyses, in which we computed the intersection of two independent maps thresholded at p 0.001, uncorrected. Images are
displayed at p 0.001. Graded color bars reflect T-statistics. Error bars indicate SEM. ***p 0.001; **p 0.01; *p 0.05. L,
Left; R, right; P, perception; M, memory.
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2012b; Baird et al., 2013;Hebart et al., 2016) (Fig. 3E, cool colors).
When testing for differences between these parametric regressors
by domain (Table 2), a memory perception contrast revealed a
significant cluster of activity in right parietal cortex (Fig. 3F,
blue), whereas there was no significant activity in a perception
memory contrast. Shared positive correlations between confi-
dence and activity in perception andmemory trials were found in
ventral striatum and in left precentral and postcentral gyri, the
latter consistent with use of the right hand to provide confidence
ratings (conjunction analysis; Fig. 3F, green). Shared negative
correlations with confidence were found in regions of right dor-
solateral PFC and medial PFC, overlapping with pre-SMA (Fig.
3F, yellow).
Complementing the ROI analysis of JR activity, we performed
an ROI analysis of CLR activity that recapitulated the whole-
brain results. We observed negative relationships between confi-
dence and activity in dACC/pre-SMA and positive relationships
in PCUN. Importantly, no significant differences in the paramet-
ric effect of confidence were found between domains in any of
our a priori ROIs (Fig. 3G; paired t tests: dACC/pre-SMA, t(23)
0.47, p 0.643; left rlPFC, t(23) 0.23, p 0.820; right rlPFC,
t(23) 1.62, p 0.119; PCUN: t(23) 0.56, p 0.583). Together
with the lack of marked domain-specific differences in confi-
dence-related activity at the whole-brain level, these results are
suggestive of an absence of domain specificity in confidence-
related activity. However, a lack of difference between univariate
activation profiles is not necessarily conclusive. For instance, dif-
ferences in confidence level may be encoded in fine-grained spa-
tial patterns of activity even when the overall BOLD activity is
evenly distributed across confidence levels (Cortese et al., 2016).
Similarly, whereas metacognition-related activity may show sim-
ilar overall levels of activation across tasks, distributed activity
patterns in frontal and parietal areas may carry distinct task-
specific information (Hebart et al., 2016; Cole et al., 2016). We
next turned to multivariate analysis methods, which are sensitive
to differences in spatial activity patterns, to test this hypothesis.
Multivariate results
We performed a series of MVPAs (Fig. 4A) focused on both JR
activity patterns and CLR activity patterns.
ROI analysis of JR activity patterns. Ifmetacognitive judgments
are based on domain-general processes (i.e., shared across per-
ceptual and memory tasks), then a decoder trained to classify JR
activity patterns in perceptual trials should accurately discrimi-
nate JR activity patterns when tested on memory trials (and vice
versa). Alternatively, domain-specific activity profiles would be
indicated by significant within-domain classification of JR activ-
ity patterns in the absence of across-domain transfer. To adjudi-
cate between these hypotheses, we performed an SVM decoding
analysis using as input vectors the runwise beta images pertaining
to confidence and follow trials obtained from a GLM (12 input
vectors in total). For within-domain classification, we used stan-
dard leave-one-out independent cross-validations for each
domain and we tested for across-domain generalization using a
cross-classification analysis (see Materials and Methods for de-
tails). Chance classification in both analyses was 50%.
Mean within-domain classification results were significantly
above chance in all ROIs (one-sample t tests Bonferroni corrected
for multiple comparisons  0.05/4 0.0125: dACC/pre-SMA
t(23) 5.77, p 6.99 10
6; L rlPFC t(23) 3.27, p 0.003; R
rlPFC t(23) 4.47, p 0.0002; PCUN t(23) 2.98, p 0.007; Fig.
4B, red and blue striped bars). In contrast, across-domain gener-
alizations were not significantly different from chance in any ROI
(one-sample t test Bonferroni corrected: dACC/pre-SMA, t(23)
1.95, p  0.06; L rlPFC, t(23)  0.79, p  0.44; R rlPFC, t(23) 
1.24, p 0.23; PCUN t(23) 1.40, p 0.17; Fig. 4B, yellow bars).
Table 1. Univariate fMRI analysis: judgment-related activity interacted with domain
Contrast Label
Voxels at
p 0.001
pfwe
cluster-corrected
Peak
z-score
Peak voxel
MNI coordinates Laterality
Memory (C F) perception (C F) Cerebellum 70 0.015 5.17 3,58,25 L/R
Insula 109 0.001 4.89 33,10,7 L
Posterior cingulate, precuneus 84 0.006 4.29 3,58, 23 L/R
Postcentral gyrus, BA3 99 0.002 4.25 45,31, 62 L
Hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, fusiform area 100 0.002 4.13 21,37,16 L
Thalamus 66 0.019 4.10 9,25,7 R
Middle and anterior cingulate gyrus, SMA, BA24, BA32 194 0.001 4.09 6, 5, 32 L/R
Inferior frontal gyrus, BA47 61 0.026 4.05 42, 20,4 L
Conjunction memory (C F) perception (C F) Cingulate gyrus, BA32 12 6, 32, 29 R
Insula 7 45, 11,7 R
Significant activations at cluster-defining threshold p 0.001, corrected for multiple comparisons at pfwe 0.05. Conjunction of significant activations at cluster-defining threshold p 0.001, uncorrected, of memory (C F) and
Perception (C F) contrasts. For more information, see Figure 3B. C, Confidence; F, follow.
Table 2. Univariate fMRI analysis: confidence-level-related activity interacted with domain
Contrast Label Voxels at p 0.001 pfwe cluster-corrected Peak z-score Peak voxel MNI coordinates Laterality
Memory perception Precuneus, BA7 93 0.003 4.21 33,70, 20 R
Conjunction (	M	P) Precentral and postcentral gyri, BA6, BA4, BA3 167 30,25, 44 L
Postcentral gyrus 27 27,46, 59 L
SMA, BA6 21 3,10, 50 L/R
Ventral striatum 16 3, 11, 7 L/R
Cerebellum 7 9,58,13 R
Postcentral gyrus 5 48,22, 44 L
Conjunction (MP) Middle frontal gyrus 29 45, 26, 20 R
Pre-SMA, BA8 19 0, 14, 50 L/R
Significant activations at cluster-defining threshold p 0.001, corrected formultiple comparisons at pfwe 0.05. Conjunction of significant activations at cluster-defining threshold p 0.001, uncorrected, ofmemory (M) and perception
(P) contrasts of positive and negative correlations with confidence level. For more information, see Figure 3F.
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As a control, classification accuracy in the ventricles was not dif-
ferent from chance (across: t(23) 0.66, p 0.52; within: t(23)
1.04, p  0.31). This suggests that the patterns of activity that
distinguish metacognitive judgments from the visuomotor control
condition in one domain are distinct fromanalogous patterns in the
other domain. In particular, within-domain classification accuracy
was significantly different from across-domain classification ac-
curacy in (dACC/pre-SMA: t(23)  2.88, p  0.008) and right
rlPFC (t(23) 2.24, p 0.035). These results are consistent with
the hypothesis that metacognitive judgments recruit domain-
specific patterns of cortical activity in PFC.
Searchlight analysis of JR activity patterns. We ran a similar
decoding analysis using an exploratory whole-brain searchlight,
obtaining a classification accuracy value per voxel (Hebart et al.,
2014). Consistent with our ROI results, we observed significant
within-domain classification in large swathes of bilateral PFC for
bothperception(red)andmemory(blue)(Fig.4C,Table3).Within-
perception classification was also successful in parietal regions, the
PCUNinparticular, andwithin-memory activity patternswere clas-
sified accurately in occipital regions. We also identified clusters
showing significant across-domain generalization (yellow) in
dACC, pre-SMA, SFG (BA9), supramarginal gyrus (BA40), and bi-
lateral IFG/insula, consistent with univariate results (Fig. 3A).
ROI analysis of CLR activity patterns. We next investigated
whether confidence is encoded in a domain-general or domain-
specific fashion by applying a similar approach to discriminate
low versus high confidence trials. In this case, ROI univariate
analyses did not reveal any differences in confidence-related ac-
A
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Figure 4. MVPA results. Classification designs. A, Left, Across-domain classification design. Pattern vectors (runwise beta images) from one domain were used to train an SVM decoder on two
classes and then tested in a cross-classificationof the same twoclassesusingvectors fromtheother domain (andvice versa). Classificationof low (L) andhigh (H) confidence levels is illustrated. Right,
Within-domain classificationdesign. Pattern vectors of two classes (e.g., lowandhigh confidence) pertaining toonedomainwereused to train adecoder in a leave-one-run-outdesign thatwas then
tested in the left-out pair. The process was iterated three times to test pairs from every run. An identical, independent cross-validation was performed on vectors from the other domain. B, C, JR
activity patterns. B, ROI results for across-domain (yellow) and mean within-domain (red-blue stripe) classification accuracy of Confidence vs Follow trials. C, Searchlight analysis for same
classifications in B. D, Low-level visuomotor mask used in F (see main text and Materials and Methods for details). E, F, CLR activity patterns. E, Low versus high confidence classification accuracy
results. F, Searchlight analysis for the same classifications in E exclusively masked for visuomotor-related activity patterns. Bars in B and E indicate means and error bars indicate SEM. Dashed lines
indicate chance classification (50%). Diamonds and circles indicatemean independent classification in perception andmemory trials, respectively.White diamonds/circles indicate classificationwas
significantly different from chance, Bonferroni corrected. All clusters in C and F are significant at cluster-defining threshold p 0.001, corrected for multiple comparisons at pFWE 0.05. Image is
displayed at p 0.001. Color bars indicate T-scores. A, anterior; P, posterior. ***p 0.001; **p 0.01; *p 0.05; all one-sample t tests are Bonferroni corrected.
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tivity between domains (Fig. 3G). We hypothesized that if confi-
dence level is encoded by domain-general neural activity
patterns, then it should be possible to train a decoder to discrim-
inate low (1–2) from high (3–4) confidence rating patterns in the
perceptual task and then accurately classify confidence patterns
on the memory task (and vice versa). In the absence of across-
domain classification, significant within-domain classification is
indicative of CLR domain-specific activity patterns. ROI cross-
classifications and cross-validations were performed in a similar
fashion as above (Fig. 4A). Two subjects did not provide ratings for
one of the classes in at least one run andwere left out from themain
analysis toavoidenteringunbalanced trainingdata into theclassifier;
however, including those subjects did not change the main result.
One-sample t tests (Bonferroni-corrected) showed that
across-domain classification of confidence was significantly
above chance in dACC/pre-SMA (t(21)  2.83, p  0.010) and
PCUN (t(21)  4.69, p  0.0001), indicative of a generic confi-
dence signal, but not in rlPFC (left: t(21) 1.36, p 0.19; right:
t(21)  0.97, p  0.34) (Fig. 4E, yellow bars). In contrast, mean
within-domain classification accuracy was significantly above
chance in right rlPFC (t(21)  3.75, p  0.001), but not in the
other ROIs (dACC/pre-SMA: t(21) 2.42, p 0.025; left rlPFC:
t(21)  1.03, p  0.32; PCUN: t(21)  1.42, p  0.17; Bonfer-
roni-corrected; Fig. 4E, red and blue striped bars). The mean
confidence classification accuracy in right rlPFC was 62% (per-
ceptual 59%, memory 64%), notably above a recently esti-
mated median 55% for decoding task-relevant information in
frontal regions (Bhandari et al., 2017). Importantly, classification
accuracy in this ROI also differed from the corresponding across-
domain classification accuracy (paired t test t(21)  2.37, p 
0.028). Classification accuracy in the ventricles was not different
from chance (across: t(21)0.24, p 0.81; within: t(21) 0.86,
p  0.40). When subjects with unbalanced data were included,
within-domain classification accuracy in right rlPFC remained at
62%, significantly above chance (t(23)  4.22; p  0.0003) and
significantly different from across-domain classification accu-
racy (paired t test: t(23) 2.54; p 0.018). Together, these results
suggest the coexistence of two kinds of CLR neural activity:
dACC/pre-SMA and PCUN encode a generic confidence signal,
whereas patterns of activity in right rlPFC were modulated by
task, allowing within- but not across-domain classification of
confidence level.
Searchlight analysis of CLR activity patterns. We ran a similar
decoding analysis of confidence level using an exploratorywhole-
brain searchlight, obtaining a classification accuracy value per
voxel. Here, we leveraged the follow trials as a control for low-
level visuomotor confounds by exclusively masking out activity
patterns associated with usage of the confidence scale (Fig. 4D).
The remaining activity patterns can therefore be ascribed to CLR
signals that do not encode visual or motor features of the rating
(Fig. 4F, Table 4). We found widespread across-domain classifi-
cation of confidence (yellow) in a predominantly midline net-
work including a large cluster encompassing dACC/pre-SMA,
vmPFC, and ventral striatum. Domain-specific CLR activity pat-
terns were successfully decoded from right PFC (insula, IFG,
BA9, BA46) inmemory trials (blue) and were also independently
decoded in both domains from dACC/pre-SMA.
Generalization of CLR activity to objective performance. To fur-
ther address the question of how confidence judgments may re-
late to activity patterns, we examined the relationship between
objective task accuracy and confidence. Previous work suggested
that the neural basis (and associated activation patterns) of con-
fidence and performance may be partly distinct (Rounis et al.,
2010; Cortese et al., 2016). Specifically, we tested the hypothesis
that we could train a decoder using CLR activity patterns to clas-
sify objective performance-related activity patterns (correct/in-
correct) on follow trials (and vice versa) in a cross-classification
analysis (collapsed across domain). This analysis confirmed that
activity patterns in dACC/pre-SMA (t(21) 2.38, p 0.027) and
right rlPFC (t(21)  2.64, p  0.015) could predict objective ac-
curacy levels in follow trials above chance (Fig. 5, light gray; un-
corrected), but not in left rlPFC (t(21) 1.49, p 0.15) or PCUN
(t(21)  0.46, p  0.65). We then compared these decoding
scores with a leave-one-run-out cross-validation decoding anal-
ysis of low versus high confidence on confidence trials only (col-
lapsed by domain; Fig. 5, dark gray; uncorrected). Consistent
with the analyses reported in Figure 4E (yellow), this decoder was
unable to classify domain-general confidence patterns of activity
in right rlPFC (t(21)  1.00; p  0.33), but was above chance in
dACC/pre-SMA (t(21) 3.80, p 0.001), left rlPFC (t(21) 2.26,
p  0.034), and PCUN (t(21)  2.56, p  0.018). Critically, in
PCUN, confidence classification was significantly greater than
confidence-performance generalization, which was at chance
(paired t test t(21)  2.16, p  0.043). This result indicates that
confidence-related patterns in PCUNdonot generalize to predict
objective performance, consistent with a partly distinct coding
of information relevant to task performance and confidence.
In contrast, in dACC/pre-SMA, general confidence level and
performance could be predicted from common patterns of
activation.
Table 3. Judgment-related activity obtained fromwhole-brain searchlight classification analyses
Classification Label
Voxels at
p 0.001
pFWE
cluster-corrected
Peak
z-score
Peak voxel
MNI coordinates Laterality
Across-domain Insula/IFG 592 0.001 4.31 33, 23, 5 L
SFG and BA9 928 0.001 4.29 24, 53, 38 R
dACC/pre-SMA 4.19 12, 14, 41 L
4.01 12, 44, 23 R
Supramarginal gyrus, BA40 207 0.039 3.93 51,55, 29 L
IFG/insula/STG 275 0.016 3.61 48, 5,13 R
Within-perception Superior, middle, medial, inferior FG, dACC, pre-SMA, BA8, BA10, BA32 4699 0.001 5.10 12, 14, 59 L/R
Parietal cortex, precuneus, supramarginal gyrus, BA7, BA40 1141 0.001 4.30 51,46, 44 R
Precuneus, BA40 339 0.010 4.21 36,46, 47 L
Within-memory Middle and superior FG, BA9, BA10 325 0.008 4.54 39, 41, 38 R
Lingual gyrus, cuneus, calcarine 510 0.001 4.53 9,91, 2 R
Superior FG, dACC, pre-SMA 1066 0.001 4.33 6,4, 62 L/R
Middle, inferior FG, BA9, BA10, BA45, BA46 1003 0.001 4.09 42, 38, 2 L
Significant activations at cluster-defining threshold p 0.001, corrected for multiple comparisons at pFWE 0.05. For more information, see Figure 4C.
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Metacognitive efficiency and CLR activity classification. Finally,
we reasoned that, if confidence-related patterns of activation are
contributing to metacognitive judgments, then they may also
track individual differences in metacognitive efficiency. To test
for such a relation, we investigated whether individual metacogni-
tive efficiency scores collapsed across domains and independently in
each domain predicted searchlight classification accuracy of confi-
dence level. We did not find any significant clusters after whole-
brain correction for multiple comparisons in domain-general,
within-perception, or within-memory analyses. However, mem-
ory metacognitive efficiency predicted memory confidence clas-
sification accuracy in a cluster in right PCUN and left precentral
gyrus (p  0.001, uncorrected), whereas perceptual metacogni-
tive efficiency predicted perceptual confidence classification
accuracy in left middle frontal gyrus, right vmPFC, bilateral tem-
poral gyri, and cerebellum (p  0.001, uncorrected). Previous
studies (Fleming et al., 2010, 2014; McCurdy et al., 2013) have
reported similar relations between perceptual andmemorymeta-
cognitive efficiency and individual differences in the structure of
prefrontal and parietal cortex, respectively. Although we do not in-
terpret these findings further here, for completeness, second-level
unthresholded statistical images of these analyses were uploaded
to Neurovault to inform future work (Gorgolewski et al., 2015)
(https://neurovault.org/collections/3232/).
Discussion
Whenperforming a cognitive task, confidence estimates allow for
comparisons of performance across a range of different scenarios
(de Gardelle and Mamassian, 2014). Such estimates must also
carry information about the task context if they are to be used in
decision making. Here, we investigated the domain generality
and domain specificity of representations that support metacog-
nition of perception and memory.
Unlike previous studies (McCurdy et al., 2013), subjects’ per-
formance was matched between domains for two different types
of stimulus, thereby eliminating potential performance and stim-
ulus confounds. Subjects’ confidence ratings were also matched
between domains and followed expected patterns of higher rat-
ings after correct decisions than after incorrect decisions. Meta-
cognitive efficiency scores between tasks were not correlated and
metacognitive efficiency scores in thememory task were superior
to those in the perceptual task. Using univariate andmultivariate
analyses, we showed the existence of both domain-specific and
domain-general metacognition-related activity during percep-
tual andmemory tasks.We report fourmain findings and discuss
each of these in turn.
First, we obtained convergent evidence from both univariate
and multivariate analyses that a cingulo-opercular network cen-
tered on dACC/pre-SMA encodes a generic signal predictive of
confidence level and objective accuracy across memory and per-
ceptual tasks. Previous studies of metacognition have implicated
the cingulo-opercular network in tracking confidence level (Fleck et
al., 2006; Fleming et al., 2012b;Hilgenstock et al., 2014;Hebart et al.,
2016). However, we go beyond these previous studies to provide
evidence that these signals generalize to predict confidence across
two distinct cognitive domains. This finding is consistent with
posterior medial frontal cortex as a nexus for monitoring the
fidelity of generic sensorimotor mappings, building on previous
findings that error-related event-related potentials originating
from this region are sensitive to variation in subjective certainty
(Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Boldt and Yeung, 2015). The activity
Table 4. Confidence level-related activity obtained fromwhole-brain searchlight classification analyses
Classification Label Voxels at p 0.001 pFWE cluster-corrected Peak z-score Peak voxel MNI coordinates Laterality
Across-domain Inferior FG, ventral striatum, ACC, BA11, BA32 2434 0.001 5.20 21, 44, 2 L/R
Superior and middle temporal gyri 176 0.001 4.99 57,52, 20 L
Middle temporal gyrus, anterior cerebellum 1193 0.001 4.92 3,46,34 R
Middle cingulate gyrus 46 0.017 4.85 6,10, 47 L/R
Superior temporal gyrus 142 0.001 4.68 66,7, 5 R
Precuneus, BA7, BA19 543 0.001 4.68 12,61, 65 L/R
Superior temporal gyrus 110 0.001 4.68 42, 26,28 L
Posterior cerebellum 96 0.001 4.54 9,85,22 L
SMA, BA6 84 0.001 4.53 9,10, 62 L/R
Superior FG, dACC, pre-SMA 482 0.001 4.39 3, 11, 56 L/R
Postcentral gyrus 186 0.001 4.33 57,19, 23 L
Middle FG 143 0.001 4.28 36, 5, 26 R
Fusiform and parahippocampal gyri 63 0.003 4.27 36,19,34 R
Middle cingulate cortex 64 0.003 4.25 0,31, 53 L/R
Posterior cerebellum 53 0.008 4.10 48,58,37 L
Inferior FG 38 0.039 3.84 27, 23,25 R
Within-perception Superior FG, dACC/pre-SMA 185 0.032 3.88 6, 29, 47 L/R
Within-memory Inferior and middle FG, insula 503 0.001 4.35 57, 23, 14 R
dACC, pre-SMA 211 0.021 3.79 9, 2, 47 L/R
Accuracy maps were masked to exclude visuomotor-related activity (see Fig. 4D). Significant activations at cluster-defining threshold p 0.001, corrected for multiple comparisons at pFWE 0.05. For more information, see Figure 4F.
Figure5. Generalization of confidence-related activity to objective accuracy. Light gray bars
denote mean cross-classification accuracy results obtained from training a decoder on CLR
activity and testing it on objective accuracy (correct/incorrect) activity patterns in the follow
condition (and vice versa). Dark gray bars denote decoding accuracy for a leave-one-out cross-
validation of low and high confidence on confidence trials only (collapsed by domain). Bars
indicate group means and SEM. Dotted line indicates chance level. *p 0.05; ***p 0.001.
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in dACC/pre-SMA was also consistently elevated by the require-
ment for ametacognitive judgment (Fleming et al., 2012b).How-
ever, the results regarding the generalizability of the pattern of
these increases across tasks were inconclusive. Whole-brain search-
light analysis revealed successful cross-classification of these ac-
tivity patterns in dACC and insular regions, consistent with the
results of the univariate analysis. These patterns of activity, how-
ever, did not generalize across tasks in a predefined region of
interest centered in dACC/pre-SMA.
Although both dACC/pre-SMA and PCUN showed signifi-
cant domain-general decoding of confidence, in PCUN these
patterns did not generalize to also predict changes in objective
accuracy. Whereas performance and subjective confidence may
both depend on similar decision variables (Kiani and Shadlen,
2009; Fleming and Daw, 2017), behavioral dissociations between
these quantities are also consistent with distinct internal states
contributing to decisions and confidence ratings (Busey et al.,
2000; Fleming andDaw, 2017). For instance, hierarchical models
of confidence formation suggest a downstream network “reads
out” decision-related information in a distinct neural population
(Insabato et al., 2010). The observed lack of cross-classification in
PCUN (Fig. 5) is consistent with the recent observation of dis-
tinct neural patterns of activity pertaining to confidence and first-
order performance revealed through multivoxel neurofeedback
in frontal and parietal regions (Cortese et al., 2016).
Second, in lateral anterior frontal cortex, we found activity
patterns that tracked both the requirement for metacognitive
judgments and level of confidence. Large swathes of lateral PFC
distinguished activity patterns pertaining to metacognitive judg-
ments that were specific for each domain. Critically, however,
confidence-related activity patterns were selective for domain in
right rlPFC (Fig. 4E): they differed according to whether the sub-
ject was engaged in rating confidence about perception or mem-
ory. Such signals may support the “tagging” of confidence with
contextual information, thereby facilitating the use of confidence
for behavioral control (Donoso et al., 2014; Purcell and Kiani,
2016). The identity of perceptual and memory tasks can be
reliably decoded from activity in right PFC neural populations
(Mendoza-Halliday and Martinez-Trujillo, 2017), consistent
with the possibility that this contextual information is recruited
during confidence rating. It is possible that anterior prefrontal
regions combine generic confidence signals with domain-specific
information to fine-tune decisionmaking and action selection in
situations in which subjects need to regularly switch between
tasks or strategies on the basis of their reliability (Donoso et al.,
2014). An alternative hypothesis, also compatible with our data,
is that PFC first estimates the confidence level specifically for the
current task, which is then relayed to medial areas to recruit the
appropriate resources for cognitive control in a task-independent
manner. Processing dynamics may also unfold simultaneously in
both areas. These possibilities echo a longstanding debate in the
cognitive control literature on the relative primacy of medial and
lateral PFC in the hierarchy of control (Kerns et al., 2004; Tang et
al., 2016). Further inquiry and development of computational
models of the hierarchical or parallel functional coupling of these
networks in metacognition is necessary.
Third, we obtained convergent evidence that PCUN plays a
specific role inmetamemory judgments. In univariate fMRI anal-
yses, we found that the requirement for a metacognitive judg-
ment recruited our preestablished region of interest centered on
PCUN only on memory, but not perceptual, trials (Fig. 3D).
Individual metacognitive efficiency scores in memory trials pre-
dicted classification accuracy in a more dorsal precuneal region,
whereas individual differences in metacognitive efficiency scores
in perceptual trials predicted classification accuracy in vmPFC
(albeit at uncorrected thresholds). These findings are consistent
with the medial parietal cortex making a disproportional contri-
bution to memory metacognition (Simons et al., 2010; Baird et
al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013) and offer a potential explanation
for a decrease in perceptual, but not memory, metacognitive ef-
ficiency seen in patients with frontal lesions (Fleming et al.,
2014). However, we do not conclude that PCUN involvement is
specific to metamemory. We note that univariate negative corre-
lations with confidence were found also on perceptual trials and
multivariate classification results in PCUN indicated the pres-
ence of both perceptual- and memory-related signals. This dual
involvement of the PCUN in perception and memory metacogni-
tion is consistent with previous studies suggesting a relationship
between PCUN structure and visual perceptual metacognition
(Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013).
Fourth, we found in both univariate and multivariate whole-
brain analyses that domain-general signals in the ventral striatum
and vmPFC (including subgenual ACC) weremodulated by con-
fidence level. These results are compatible with previous findings
finding activity in the ventral striatum to be positively correlated
with confidence (Daniel and Pollmann, 2012; Hebart et al., 2016;
Guggenmos et al., 2016). Evidence of vmPFC encoding of confi-
dence signals has been reported in connectionwith decisionmak-
ing and value judgments (DeMartino et al., 2013; Lebreton et al.,
2015). Our experimental design, however, does not allow us to
disentangle whether the signals found in these regions pertain
uniquely to confidence or if they are entangledwith implicit value
and reward signals (e.g., the expected value of being correct). Future
experiments are needed to explicitly decouple reward from confi-
dence to resolve this issue.
In our experimental design, perception and memory blocks
were interleaved across runs,which raises the question as towhether
the domain-specific neural substrates that we foundwould persist if
subjects had to switch between tasks more often. Due to intertask
“leaks” in confidence (Rahnev et al., 2015), in which confidence
in one task influences confidence ratings on the following task (or
even in the following trial), there is a possibility that interleaving
blocks of different tasks might favor the observation of more
domain-general confidence-related patterns.
Our experimental design assumes that visual perception and
memory are distinct domains. We acknowledge that distinguish-
ing between cognitive domains or individuating perceptual mo-
dalities is not straightforward (Macpherson, 2011). For instance,
different modalities (e.g., vision, audition, touch, etc.), different
aspects within a single modality (e.g., motion and color within
vision), or closely related modalities (e.g., visual perception vs
visual short-term memory) could be part of a unified perceptual
domain for metacognitive purposes. Recent findings suggest that
metacognitive efficiency in one perceptual modality predicts meta-
cognitive efficiency inothers and that they share electrophysiological
markers (Faivre et al., 2018). Metacognitive efficiency is also corre-
lated across vision and visual short-term memory, especially for
features such as orientation (Samaha and Postle, 2017), and
dACC and insula regions similar to those identified here have
been found to show univariate confidence signals across both
color and motion tasks in the visual domain (Heereman et al.,
2015). However, it is an open question whether more fine-
grained, modality-specific patterns of metacognitive activity
could be decoded using multivariate approaches. More research
is needed on the neural architecture of metacognition in other
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cognitive domains and whether this architecture changes in a
graded or discrete fashion as a function of task or stimulus.
In summary, our results provide evidence for the coexistence
of content-rich metacognitive representations in anterior PFC
with generic confidence-related signals in frontoparietal and cin-
gulo-opercular regions. Such an architecturemaybe appropriate for
“tagging” lower-level feelings of confidence with higher-order con-
textual information to allow effective behavioral control. Previous
studies have tended to draw conclusions about either domain-
specific or domain-general aspects of metacognition. Here, we
reconcile these perspectives by demonstrating that both domain-
specific and domain-general signals coexist in the human brain,
thus laying the groundwork for a mechanistic understanding of
reflective judgments of cognition.
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